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T h ea c a d e m i cl i t e r a t u r eo nc r e d i tr i s kh a sh i storically been more focused on the pricing
of credit risk rather than on risk management issues. As pricing relies on the risk neutral
measure researchers concentrate on modelling the dynamics of credit quantities (in particular
default probabilities and spreads) using stock and bond markets factors (e.g. Duﬀee (1999)
or Driessen (2002)). The approach has theoretical grounds both from structural models (ﬁrm-
value based) and reduced-form models (intensity based). The former are closely linked to
ﬁnancial markets as they model default as the ﬁrst time at which ﬁrm assets value fall below
liabilities. The intensity based methodology is more convenient for pricing and provides simple
extensions to multiple assets (e.g. see Duﬃe and Singleton (2003)), but ignores what the default
mechanisms are. Recent works have tried to bridge the gap between the two approaches by
keeping the ﬂexibility of intensity models but introducing default determinants (e.g. Duﬃe&
Wang (2004)).
However, some short cuts have been made in the understanding of the default process. More
precisely structural models insights have not been fully exploited. A ﬁrst series of caveats lie
in the source of information used to predict credit riskiness. Changes in default probabilities
have been reduced as consequences of ﬁnancial markets movements. This might explain the re-
ported weak explanatory performance of proposed common factors on credit spread variations.
Meanwhile analyses demonstrate that common factors should account for the largest part of
observed deformations (e.g. see Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein & Martin (2001)). Yet business
conditions, or more generally the business cycle, have strong implications on ﬁrm assets values.
This part of the global economy cannot be left aside without empirical justiﬁcations. In the
same way, observed patterns of the default cycle have not been encompassed. It is smoother
than the ﬁnancial markets changes and more persistent after economic crisis. Such particular
features have to be endogenously extracted from credit markets and from the rating process. A
second important source of misspeciﬁcation resides in the use of contemporaneous explanatory
variables. Past information should arguably convey strong explanatory power on the behaviour
of realized default probabilities. This is motivated by the fact that in a large majority defaults
do not arise suddenly but are rather the conclusion of a long lasting process. Some structural
models already take advantage of this observation requiring the liabilities barrier to be crossed
by assets value several times or during a deﬁned amount of time before they signal the default
(e.g. François & Morellec (2004) or Moraux (2004)).
Obviously such issues are of prime importance for risk management. It calls for knowledge
and ideally forecasts of realized default probabilities, which translates into a deep knowledge of
their determinants. Remark however that the comprehension of risk-neutral credit risk is not a
substitute for historical default probabilities. On the one hand, to ﬁlter out market assessment
of default probabilities from prices, we need speciﬁc assumptions on liquidity or/and recovery
risk. On the other hand, the adequate change of measure required to recover default behaviour
under the historical measure is still unknown1 and the practical implementation appears to be
a matter of adhoc adjustments. Yet historical default probabilities constitute critical inputs
of popular commercial credit risk portfolio models. Even for pricing purposes, information
1Note that Jarrow Lando & Yu (2005) provided a theoretical framework in that direction.
2arising from historical probabilities are relevant for defaultable asset pricing models such as
the Jarrow Lando & Turnbull (1997) speciﬁcation as well as for hedging as shown by Bielecki,
Jeanblanc & Rutkowski (2004). Moreover as shown by Fledelius, Lando & Nielsen (2004) and
Couderc (2004), the historical measure allows for a ﬁner analysis of the default drivers. Indeed
calendar time eﬀects can easily be separated out from duration or "life cycle" eﬀects on the
default probabilities deformations.
Using the intensity-based technology to estimate historical default probabilities on Stan-
dard & Poor’s ratings database, this paper largely extends previous analyses by putting more
structure on the intensity model. It provides new insights into the determinants of intensities.
More precisely we perform a detailed analysis of explanatory variables through parametric
and semi-parametric factor models. Parametric models let us identify marginal impacts of
the credit markets, the business cycle and the ﬁnancial market. The semi-parametric models,
accommodating possible "life cycle" eﬀects (i.e. changes in default probabilities arising from
the "age" of a company or from the time it has spent in a given risk class)2 are particularly
convenient diagnostic tools. They allow us to check misspeciﬁcations of multifactor ﬁnancial
market based models, and to assess the beneﬁts of considering other identiﬁed predictors.
The contributions of the paper are fourfold. First, we provide extensive empirical analyses
of the behaviour of default probabilities conditioning on ﬁnancial markets, business cycle and
credit market indicators. We explore each driver of default and its horizons, showing that
all these economic components contribute to the default likelihood over the following three
to ﬁve years. Second, we test the appropriateness of factor models relying solely on ﬁnancial
information. We show that it leads to underevaluate default peaks and to overshoot probabili-
ties during stable and low-default periods. But including business and endogenous information
largely reduces these errors and greatly increases changes in probabilities explained by common
factors. Third, we exhibit the critical importance of past information because it both captures
economic trends and lead-lag eﬀects between the economy and the default cycle. Past co-
variates partly take into account the lower speed and higher pesistence of the default cycle.
Finally, exploring other potential sources of endogenous information from industries, we prove
that some industries are forerunner of the global business cycle whereas others just suﬀer from
its consequences. This is achieved using autoregressive models that are more traditionally ap-
plied to high frequency trade data. Thus industrial default cycles appear as good candidates
to characterize and forecast more accurately the behaviour of default probabilities.
The paper is organised as follows. In the ﬁrst Section we brieﬂy present the ratings data
and discuss potential default drivers included in our analyses. Section 2 studies sensitivities
of the default cycle with respect to ﬁnancial markets, business and credit indicators through
conditional single factor models of intensities. It provides a more thorough analysis of the time
span of covariates’ impacts and tests possible "life cycle" eﬀects. A semi-parametric setting is
proposed in Section 3 in order to evaluate strengths and weaknesses of factor models according
2In retail credit both age and calendar time eﬀects are routinely used, but the literature on corporate credit
often ignores those eﬀects without empirical support. Furthermore emark that duration frameworks and more
particularly Cox-type semi-parametric speciﬁcations such as that proposed in this study have already been used
in ﬁnance. For instance Lunde, Timmermann & Blake (1999) applied the methodology to study the performance
of mutual funds.
3to the information they use. We then proceed with the assessment of market driven multifactor
models and show that business and credit components are essential additional determinants of
default. In addition we demonstrate that economic trends and past information play a crucial
role in explaining default. In Section 4 we discuss exploratory issues. In particular thanks
to parsimonious ACD models we show strong diﬀerences between industrial default cycles
which should prove useful to further explain default riskiness. Our results deliver guidelines
for future research, and should be meaningful for the broad class of models that are used by
practitioners as well as for the speciﬁcation of reduced form pricing models. They ultimately
oﬀer analyses of predictive variables of future default probabilities while keeping in mind the
history of companies in the rating process.
I. Potential Determinants of Default
A. Ratings and Duration Data
Ratings allow to classify ﬁrms into "homogenous" classes of default risk, the default being
the ultimate grade which can be attributed. Our ratings data was extracted from Standard
& Poor’s Credit Pro 6.6 database. This database contains S&P’s rating histories for 10439
companies over the period January 1981 to December 2003. Overall 33044 rating migrations are
recorded in CreditPro as well as 1386 defaults and default rate ranges from 3% to 29% across
industries. Remark that credit reviews concluding to no changes in rating are not reported
in the database. Such data could indicate whether agencies revise their credit risk assessment
more frequently during speciﬁc part of the business cycle or not. This could induce a bias in our
ﬁndings as it would lead to sharper decrease/increase in estimated default intensities during
peaks and throughs. However S&P argues that ratings are reviewed on a regular basis, and
more frequently if substantial new information arises. Furthermore a rating is only modiﬁed
when the likelihood of default changes signiﬁcantly and if this change is not purely transitory.
Therefore this should not constitute a restriction in our case. The Credit Pro database has
already been used and extensively described by Bangia & al. (2002) over the period January
1981 to December 1998.
Rating events require careful treatment as three sources of censoring are present in the
database. Left truncation arises from the fact that 1371 issuers had already received a rating
before they were included in the database (i.e. before January 1981). We do not have infor-
mation about the attribution date of their ﬁrst rating and therefore for robustness checks we
r u na l le s t i m a t i o n sb o t ho nt h ef u l ls a m p l ea n do n the reduced sample excluding left-censored
data (the reduced sample contains 9068 companies and 25993 rating migrations). Obviously, a
ﬁrst type of right censoring is also an inherent feature of any ratings database as most compa-
nies survive after the end of the recordings. Another speciﬁct y p eo fr i g h tc e n s o r i n gr e q u i r e s
speciﬁc consideration. Some companies leave the ratings process and fall into the not-rated
(NR) category. Several reasons may explain this fact: the rated company may be acquired by
another ﬁrm or may simply decide no longer to be rated by S&P. The database has the nice
feature to identify ﬁrms that migrated to NR and subsequently defaulted. Therefore the NR
4class is not a complete loss of information: although there is no longer any indication of credit
quality, a NR ﬁrm is a non defaulter.
Within our sample, ﬁrms are classiﬁed by industrial groups and each of them has been
reﬁned by subindustry criteria. Practically, we have at our disposal 13 industries or 526 distinct
subindustries distributed among 93 countries. But 6897 ﬁrms or 66% are US ones. Moreover,
S&P attributes 25 distinct ratings plus the NR one, but we aggregate the data coming from
a grade and its plus/minus modiﬁers because of minimal population requirements. Besides,
all grades below B- have been put in the CCC class. Let us notice that such a database
allows to consider two types of durations, implying two diﬀerent approaches to the behaviour
of default probabilities. On the one hand we can look at times-to-default from entry in a
risk class up to the last available observation. This perspective constitutes the primary goal
of ratings : agencies use ratings to rank ﬁrms in cross-section with respect to their expected
default probability. Thus splitting the sample of ﬁrms on the basis of ratings should lead to
homogenous classes of risk. On the other hand, we can examine times-to-default conditional on
staying in a given risk class up to the default time. By doing so, the emphasis is put on rating
migrations giving stonger relevance to rating changes. Actually the diﬀerence lies in the way
default probabilities are assumed to evolve. In the ﬁrst case ﬁrms can change continuously their
default probability. In the second case the default probability should remain constant within
a rating class and jump when the rating is revised. The latter corresponds to the standard
Markov chain assumption.
B. Default Drivers
In this section we present potential determinants of default intensities that will be used
to calibrate log-linear models. Several authors calibrate mainstream models on ﬁnancial vari-
ables : interest rates for reduced form models and equity information for structural models.
For instance Duﬀee (1999), Driessen (2002) or Collin-Dufresne & al. (2001) examine impacts
of selected ﬁnancial covariates on credit spreads. The business cycle has also been factored
in other papers (e.g. see Koopman & Lucas (2004)) whose primary focus is on the cyclicality
of credit and macroeconomic variables. To our knowledge there exists no systematic study of
the determinants of default including both ﬁnancial and non ﬁnancial variables. In addition
all studies concentrate on contemporaneous market variables, and ignore lag eﬀects. Default
is typically reduced to a short term process. Keeping in mind these two points we investi-
gate potential drivers from various sectors of the economy, i.e. from ﬁnancial markets, from
the business cycle and from the default cycle itself. We also distinguish speciﬁcc r e d i tc y c l e
information from ﬁnancial markets. Given that our rating and default sample is primarily
American, we use US explanatory variables. Many of these variables are redundant and will
be eliminated at the estimation stage in multi-factor analysis. Our data was extracted from
the Federal Reserve of St. Louis website and Bloomberg.
5Financial Markets Information
- Return on S&P500: Short and mid term economic performance should be positively cor-
related with S&P500’s returns and we expect a negative impact on default intensities.
Furthermore, an increase in equity prices tends to decrease ﬁrm leverage and therefore
also push down default probabilities.
- Volatility of S&P500 returns: In a traditional Merton (1974)-type model, the two drivers of
default probability are leverage and the volatility of ﬁrms’ assets. The volatility of equity
returns is often used as a proxy for the latter and we expect it to have a positive impact
on default intensities. We use the realized annualized volatility computed over the last
60 trading days3.
- 10 year treasury yield: Higher interest rate levels imply higher cost of borrowing. Hence, this
variable could impact positively on default probabilities. However interest rates tend to
be lower in contraction periods and higher in expansions. Thus the ultimate impact on
intensities is uncertain and may depend on issuer quality.
- Slope of term structure (10 year rate minus 1 year rate): Steep term structures of interest
rates are usually associated with strong growth prospects and we expect this variable to
impact negatively on mid- to long-term intensities.
Business Cycle
We believe that it is crucial to extract information from the business cycle. If stocks were
available for all ﬁr m sa n dm a r k e t sw e r ef u l l ye ﬃcient, ﬁnancial markets and the business cycle
might be redundant. As it is not the case, we include standard proxies of business health.
- Real GDP growth: As a signal of current macro-economic conditions this variable should be
negatively correlated with short term probabilities.
- Industrial production growth: This is an alternative growth measure which should have a
similar impact as that of GDP growth. Advantage lies in the more frequent update of
these series.
- Personal Income Growth: Same expected impact as the previous two variables.
- CPI growth: Inﬂation is again a general indicator of economic conditions. We expect to
observe a negative correlation with short term default probabilities, as high inﬂation has
often been associated with growth.
3Using the historical volatility or an implied volatility from the VIX or the VXO could be an issue. We argue
that implied volatility essentially contains information on the next transitory shock in ﬁnancial market, but
as our results reveal, trends are much more important in determining future changes in default probabilities.
Furthermore, no implied volatility time series is available over our entire observation period starting 1981.
Starting from 1987, unreported results from the VXO percentage changes prove that implied volatility has no
explanatory power on default intensities.
6Credit Market Information
Beside general economic variables and ﬁnancial information, more speciﬁc credit factors should
prove valuable in explaining default intensities.
- Spread of long term BBB bonds over treasuries: Spreads should reﬂect the default probability
as well as expected recoveries and a liquidity premium. It should therefore be positively
correlated with default intensities.
- Spread of long term BBB bonds over AAA bonds: This variable factors in the risk aversion
of investors and may be a measure of their risk forecast. It ﬁlters out mixed eﬀects
contained into the BBB spread. Furthermore, an increase in the relative spread may
reﬂect an increase in ﬁrms’ asset volatilities (see Prigent, Renault & Scaillet (2001)). We
therefore expect default intensities to increase with this variable.
- Net issues of Treasury securities: This indicator should positively impact short term proba-
bilities of default as higher deﬁcit and borrowing is an indicator of economic diﬃculties
(it is at least negatively correlated with the business cycle). Furthermore, high public
sector borrowing may crowd out private borrowers and lead to increased ﬁnancial diﬃ-
culties for ﬁrms. However, if borrowing is used for investments, an increase in Treasury
issuance may be linked to stronger growth in the long term and decreasing probabilities
of default.
- Money lending (M2-M1) and bank credit growth: These factors measure credit liquidity
and should be associated with default intensities. However it is well known that the
information content of this indicator and more particularly of M2 has changed a lot on
our period. In particular a series of adjustments have been done by the Federal Reserve.
As a consequence this indicator cannot be conclusive on the short run, but its implications
on the long run (more than one year) have turned out to be pretty stable. We thus expect
clearer impacts when using the lag operator.
Our dataset includes both forward looking and current information. In particular, stock
market components, CPI and personal income growth deliver snapshots of current global busi-
ness conditions whereas interest rate-based measures also contain expectations of future eco-
nomic conditions. Default is not a fully exogenous process but is often the result of renego-
tiations between the ﬁrm and its creditors. Good economic prospects should induce investors
to renegotiate contracts rather than trigger liquidation. This should be reﬂected in the signif-
icance of some "forward looking" explanatory variables.
Before turning to regressions of intensities on the above variables, we run a principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA) on this set of economic indicators to determine how many factors were
necessary to explain most of the variations in intensities. Using the eigenvalue criteria, we
found that ﬁve signiﬁcant factors explain a cumulated percentage of 71% of the total varia-
tions captured by this information set. PCA analysis on non-parametric estimates of default
intensities based on the Gamma kernel (rather than on the raw data) also suggests that four
7to ﬁve factors are relevant and account for 73% to 94% of the changes in intensities4.T h e
relatively low explanatory power obtained with 5 factors in the PCA analysis indicates that it
is unlikely that we will be able to explain more than 75% of variations in default probabilities
using the set of variables presented above but we can expect to reach a higher ﬁgure than the
25% reported in empirical applications as Collin-Dufresne & al. (2001) for the credit cycle.
Inner Dynamics of the Default Cycle
A striking feature of the default cycle might not be captured by the above variables. After the
last two recessions strong persistencies in default rates have been observed. The number of
defaults remained high even during economic recoveries. The default cycle seems to exhibit its
own dynamics. Thus we believe that the set of predictive variables should be expanded with
default endogenous variables. Kavvathas (2000) used as explanatory variables the weighted log
upgrade-downgrade ratio and the weighted average rating of new issuers. He actually only took
into account the ﬁrst PCA factor of these variables, but other variables may also be relevant.
The average rating of ﬁnancial institutions may be of primary interest in describing the short
term trend of the global economy (in terms of credit crunch for instance). This trend can also
be captured by the ratio of downgrades over all non-stayer transitions. As representative of
the default cycle trend we choose to include the following rating-based variables:
- IG and NIG5 upgrade rates : both variables should include information on economic health.
- IG and NIG downgrade rates : downgrades should be higher in bad conditions.
One may also want to add ﬁrm speciﬁc factors such as leverage, cash ﬂows or size which
constitute the main determinants of bankruptcy as pointed out by Lennox (1999). In particular,
historically the size of the ﬁrms seems to induce very diﬀerent behaviours. Moreover, these
factors may be introduced at aggregate levels, for instance to provide a measure of the solvency
of new issuers. Recently, Duﬃe & Wang (2004) used the earnings ratio and ﬁrm size as
speciﬁc factors, jointly with a measure of the distance-to-default. However ratings should
constitute stable and good proxies for ﬁrm-speciﬁc components and a fair alternative as speciﬁc
variables are not always available. From an accounting perspective, default cannot realistically
be initiated by small changes in earnings, leverage or any balance sheet information but rather
by negative trends or by unexpected large changes in cash ﬂows. Any negative trend should
have been incorporated in issuer ratings. Furthermore as pointed out by Collin-Dufresne & al.
(2001) who used leverage, idiosyncratic factors do not represent the dominant factor in credit
risk changes and seem to exhibit lower explanatory power than common components.
[INSERT TABLE I HERE]
4The number of factors and cumulated explanatory power depend on the risk class considered, i.e. whether
one uses the entire sample, or only non investment grades, BB, B or CCC ﬁrms. The non-parametric PCA
inputs are estimated increments in intensity from the Gamma kernel intensity estimator (see Section III.A).
5The investment grades class (IG) gathers the AAA, AA, A and BBB classes whereas BB, B and CCC classes
are collected in the non investment grades (NIG) class.
8Table I presents basic statistics on the set of retained factors. Obviously some of the above
variables such as the real GDP growth and the industrial production growth are highly cor-
related, which would deteriorate statistical signiﬁcance on the full set of variables. However
our main purpose consists of identifying the relevant factors and their relationship with de-
fault probabilities. Therefore, we will concentrate on univariate and parsimonious multivariate
analysis.
II. Predictors and Indicators of the Default Cycle
The analysis of the impacts and explanatory powers of the potential determinants of de-
fault discussed above requires to deﬁne a basic framework. In ﬁnance a simple and traditional
practice to study the eﬀects of structural factors on stock returns consists of performing re-
gressions of returns on the explanatory variables. Investigations of spreads follow the same
approach. Instantaneous default probabilities (or intensities) are not directly observable, and
we therefore propose to use an analogous technique on conditional distributions in order to
examine sensitivities of default intensities on our information set. As intensities have to be pos-
itive, we deﬁne "regressions" of log-intensities6. These models are known as log-linear duration
models. We brieﬂy recall the basics of these models and then turn to estimations. We start
with time-dependent covariates which embed the impact of successive shocks of the economic
environment on intensities. We diﬀerentiate impacts of current and past conditions. Then we
consider time-independent covariates which aim at capturing potential eﬀects of initial condi-
tions (e.g. the state of the economy at a ﬁrm’s entry in the risk class). We refer to this last
phenomenon as life cycle eﬀects or time proﬁles since a factor is likely to modify the risk of
default of ﬁr m so v e rt h e i rw h o l el i f ei nag i v e nr i s kc l a s s .
A. Factor Models of Intensities
For a ﬁrm i, let Di denote the uncensored duration up to default and Ci the censored
duration. Ui =m i n ( Ci,D i) is the time at which the ﬁrm leaves the class either because of
censoring (Ci)o rd e f a u l t( Di).T h e Ui are the true observations, jointly with indicators of
censoring. We also let Z denote a vector of explanatory variables. We consider intensities
as exponential aﬃne functions of factors which remain constant between two observations of
the factors. Hence, conditional on the realization of the covariates, durations are piecewise
exponential :
λi (u,ti)=e x p
¡
γ + β0Z(ti,u+ ti)
¢
∀i. (1)
where Z can include a mixture of time-dependent and time-independent covariates. The ex-
ponentiality assumption could be relaxed by replacing the constant exp(γ) by another formu-
lation. For instance one could impose a conditional Weibull hazard where the covariates may
6Let us recall that continuous intensities fully characterize continuous distributions. Therefore, we cannot
talk about regressions because intensities are not estimated in a ﬁrst step and then log-regressed on independent
variables. Actually factor models of intensities specify conditional distributions and are estimated in a single
stage.
9be time-dependent (through u + ti) and/or time-independent (through ti).
Our chosen parametric framework allows to use eﬃcient and tractable estimation techniques
for b β, namely maximum likelihood7. The standard estimation procedure works in the following
way. Assuming that structural variables dynamics are independent, the likelihood is separable
into two terms, one related to the dynamics of covariates and the other one dealing with con-
ditional durations. Therefore if we are not interested in factors dynamics, we can ignore this
part and focus purely on durations. For a given ﬁrm i, the likelihood l of observed duration
ui can be written conditionally on factors realizations at ﬁrm’s "death or exit" but the whole











where l1 is the univariate likelihood of conditional durations and l2 the likelihood associated
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I(di>ci) + λi (ui,t i) I(di≤ci)
¢
(2)
where c1,..,c n (resp. d1,..,d n) are realizations of censoring variables C1,..,C n (resp. default
durations D1,..,D n).
The estimation of this model is therefore quite straightforward and both censored and de-
fault durations contribute to the likelihood. The main task is the selection of appropriate
explanatory variables. Empirical results on this speciﬁcation are provided in next sections.
B. Economic Shocks over Time and their Persistency
In this section, we determine whether intensities are sensitive to each factor identiﬁed pre-
viously. We also explore the necessity to lag factors to extract more information. Surprisingly,
the issue of lagged information has been ignored in most papers, although Koopman & Lucas
(2004) and Kwark (2002) have reported lagged eﬀects between the market and the credit cycle.
We analyse the explanatory power of each factor performing maximum likelihood estimations.
For each covariate we run distinct lagged estimations to examine the persistency of its eﬀects.
In all cases, we look at 95% and 99% conﬁdence tests, and likelihood ratio. The alternative
model of the likelihood ratio test corresponds to unconditional exponentiality, i.e. the case of
constant intensity. We also break our dataset into several samples, namely investment grade
(IG), non investment grade (NIG), AA, A, BBB, BB, B and CCC samples. For each of these
7See Duﬃe & Wang (2004) for a clear presentation of maximum likelihood in this case.
10risk classes we look both at durations to ﬁrst exits from the risk class and durations to last
days of observation. Further robustness checks are performed by leaving out left truncated
ﬁrms and, focusing on the US subsample.
Tables II, III and IV present results on the IG and NIG8 samples respectively over ﬁnan-
cial, business and credit indicators. Table V reports estimates of sensitivities with respect to
upgrade and downgrade rates over rating classes. We have found that the sample used makes
little diﬀerences to the results. For example, considering durations up to the ﬁrst exits keeps
sensitivities almost unchanged and only lowers the signiﬁcance of parameters. Focusing on
the US subsample does not modify estimates more than 10% on average, and does not alter
signs. Such robustness could be expected as risk classes are quite stable and the whole sample
is made of 66% US ﬁrms. From a general perspective all variables are signiﬁcant. In addition,
these ﬁndings do not change across ratings. Nevertheless sensitivities have to be expounded
with care. For a same level, with an average intercept around -13.1 for IG and -8.8 for NIG,
the explanatory power is indeed weaker for IG. It is worth mentioning that due to the expo-
nential speciﬁcation, only signs, signiﬁcance levels and likelihood ratios can provide insights,
whereas possible diﬀerences in sensitivity levels across distinct samples cannot be interpreted.
We observe that lagged covariates are signiﬁcant at all stages too.
[INSERT TABLE II HERE]
Recent Economic Changes
Looking carefully at signs for lags up to two years, we observe that the probability of default
covaries with the expected signs. Financial markets impact default probabilities as predicted
by structural models. Increases in the market index decrease the probability of default while
increases in volatility push up probabilities. Increases in interest rates are good news because
they reﬂect anticipation of growth. On the contrary decreases in short term yield increase
default probabilities as low rates are strongly correlated with recessions. A steep contempo-
raneous or recent (less than one year) slope of the term structure of riskless rates tends to be
associated with higher intensities of default while past steep slopes (over one year lags) tend to
decrease intensities. The only exception to this short term/long term split is for the CCC class,
for which a steep slope is always associated with lower intensities, irrespective of the lags. This
can be explained by changes in the dominant eﬀect according to the ﬁrm’s structure. First,
low short term interest rates can indicate a slowing down of economic activity and it increases
competition in the corporate bond market. Second, increases in long term interest rates are
often interpreted as expectation of higher growth. Future growth may be dominant eﬀect for
junk issuers, as these companies are highly levered and require strong business conditions to
move up the rating ladder.
[INSERT TABLE III HERE]
8Further results are available on request.
11The business cycle appears to have large eﬀects on the default cycle. Of course business
expansion provides good news for default whereas credit crunch ampliﬁes defaults from the
money lending variable. However if average levels of intensities (not reported) from the models
using the S&P500 returns and the real GDP growth are comparable, the GDP involves much
larger impacts: from contemporaneous variables, an increase by one percent in the real GDP
growth levels down intensities by 17.5% for IG (resp. 20.3% for NIG) whereas the same in-
crease in the S&P500 return decreases intensities by 2.7% (resp. 2.1%). The higher stability
of the business cycle indicators is certainly partly responsible for such diﬀerences, since the
default cycle is far less volatile than ﬁnancial markets. Credit markets also display signiﬁcant
explanatory power, the BBB spread being a key indicator. Net treasury issues and money
lending variables have minor impacts on intensities. We argue that this is due to their weak
short term informational content. Furthermore, looking at likelihood ratios (LR), we observe
that the default cycle and the credit cycle are not necessarily synchronous. Estimated sensi-
tivities exhibit the best LR using forward credit covariates (IG spread, BBB yield). Similarly
some factors like the personal income growth are not appropriate as they seem to lag the
default cycle rather than lead it. Causality analysis in that direction would be particularly
relevant for future research. Finally aggregate default indicators appear as major explanatory
components. They express the persistency of the default cycle both in declines and recoveries.
Studies of rating migrations (e.g. Nickell, Perraudin & Varotto (2000)) have shown that the
NIG downgrade ratio is highly correlated with increases in the number of defaults. Further
estimations show that including such an endogenous factor is highly relevant (see below).
[INSERT TABLE IV HERE]
[INSERT TABLE V HERE]
Behaviour w.r.t Past Conditions
Older information provides further insights on the explanatory power and the time-span of
economic shocks over the default cycle. Sensitivities to covariates are either constant, increasing
or decreasing as lags increase. They evidence the high degree of persistency of economic shocks
on the ﬁrms likelihood of default. It bears major implications from a modelling standpoint even
for reduced form models because Markovian processes are unlikely to provide such features.
Besides we ﬁnd that some factors impact diﬀerently on default probabilities in the long run.
The S&P500, the term structure slope, the real GDP growth and net treasury issues appear to
be leading indicators of future peaks of defaults, thus showing that the default cycle lags the
economy. The interesting point lies in the signs of these covariates which come as warnings:
expansion peaks of the ﬁnancial market or of the business cycle seem to announce increases
in the number of defaults three years later. This has to be taken with care as it could only
represent the singularities of the global economy over the past 25 years and not necessary
apply to the future. For example early repayments and small levels of issues by US Treasury
signaled the peak of the US cycle which was later followed by a major default crisis. Hence
negative net treasury issues increase future default probability at a three year horizon in our
sample. Interestingly notice that these lagged eﬀects should also be signiﬁcant because the
12default process is time consuming from its origination as reported by Altman (1989). From
that perspective, the default cycle has to remain high after economic recoveries, generating
explanatory power for lagged covariates and persistency for economic shocks. Therefore we
argue that lagged factors when used as supplementary information could at least help in
capturing business and market trends, which constitute the essential information on future
default probability9. Section III.D examines this issue. Finally we point out that, as expected,
the money lending indicator has a much larger inﬂuence on the long run and could be used in
that way.
C .F a c t o r sa sD e t e r m i n a n t so fT i m ep r o ﬁles
Results on the time-span of economic shocks suggest that economic conditions could de-
termine ﬁrms’ default time proﬁles within rating classes. Moreover economic variables are
intuitive candidates for the explanation of the shape of intensities over distinct vintages. For
example Bassett & Zakrajsek (2003) have reported singularities for loans granted during reces-
sions. The average quality of new loans is lower than usual but comes back to standards after
the crisis. This should translate into higher intensities over the ﬁrst months for such vintages.
In order to test this hypothesis, we rely on the time-independent covariates setup.
Considering intensities up to the last day of observation from entry in the rating process,
estimates b β do not show any evidence at any conventional conﬁdence level that some covariates
have signiﬁcant impacts over the whole intensity curve whatever the rating class we consider.
We can reasonably believe that if a company faces credit diﬃculties when it enters into a
speciﬁc risk class, either these diﬃculties should be absorbed or at least diluted after a while,
or the company should default. In the latter case, the company should be quickly downgraded.
Similarly, strong business growth in a sector may vanish quickly as that sector is likely to
become more competitive, and also because any worthwhile project has limited duration. Hence
as the duration increases, economic shocks on its distribution should prevail over possible
diﬀerences in initial exposures in default risk.
As a consequence, instead of looking for impacts on full time proﬁles, we focus on short and
mid term horizons within rating classes. Practically, we run maximum likelihood estimations
on subsamples imposing additional right and left truncation on durations. We considered
durations, up to 1 year, 3 years, 5 years, between 1 and 3 years, and ﬁnally between 3 and
5 years. Such cut-outs are suggested from Table II. As before we looked at factors’ impact
individually (results not reported here). All empirical results conﬁrmed the ﬁndings of Tables II
and V in the following way. If economic conditions do not aﬀect the whole default time proﬁle,
the duration of a company within a rating class at such horizons is inﬂuenced by conditions at
e n t r yi nt h ec l a s s .
9Indeed, for instance, from time series cycle analysis between the GDP and bankruptcy rates, Koopman
& Lucas (2004) observe diﬀerences in magnitude and lengths. The default cycle being much smoother and
persistent than the ﬁnancial market or the business cycles, transitory shocks should not represent the most
relevant information.
13Using time-independent covariates, we ﬁnd that factor signs are the same as those we
obtained previously in the case of time-dependent covariates with lags from 0 to 2 years. This
implies that the signiﬁcance of the impacts of the real GDP, the S&P 500 returns, net treasury
issues and the slope of the term structure, for lags longer than 2 years are weaker than those
obtained for shorter lags. Shorter lags are intuitively those that provide the dominant eﬀects
on default intensities.
As a consequence, observed decreases and increases in intensities in the very short run
could easily be handled through conditioning on information at the ﬁrm’s entry in the risk
class. This would be especially relevant in short term risk management. It captures cyclical
quality of new issues as well as possible conservatism in rating analysts’ classiﬁcations without
relying on adhoc adjustments. Moreover it implies that, at the time of a rating change, short
term risk predictions (less than 2 years) can be proxied through factors at that date and do
not necessary require the prediction of factors. In addition our ﬁndings reveal the following
behaviour in default distributions: as time from entry elapses, default risks of all ﬁrms in a
given class globally converge toward the same level which is in turn inﬂuenced by shocks and
trends in the economy.
III. Factors Eﬃciency and Default Decomposition
We now turn to the assessment of these factor models and, more generally, of the eﬃciency
of the information set in explaining and predicting observed patterns of the default cycle.
Following such goals Kavvathas (2000) and Aunon-Nerin & Burkhard (2003) have shown that
economic variables do not explain a huge part of transition probability changes. Closer to our
study, Collin-Dufresne & al. (2001) also report 25% to 30% of explanatory power by macro-
economic factors on spread changes. Their residuals are highly cross correlated and there is
only one signiﬁcant underlying factor which cannot be explained by their state variables. Such
a factor will be examined later in Section IV.A. The explanatory variables used in Collin-
Dufresne & al. included interest rates indicators, changes in volatility, expected recovery rates
and leverage. One noticeable result is that, contrary to structural model predictions, systematic
factors seem to be more important than ﬁrm-speciﬁc ones in explaining spread changes. Yet
the authors argue that the failure of their state variables to capture a large amount of the
systematic part of spreads should be due to the strong impact of local demand/supply shocks.
We now bring complementary answers to these issues.
In the following we propose a semi-parametric framework which allows us to extract vari-
ations in default intensities which are not explained by a given factor model. By doing so, we
are able to study misspeciﬁcations of factor models and to compare the pertinence of the var-
ious covariates. In particular we show that explained variations in intensities could be widely
underestimated because of inappropriate choices in the information set. For instance leaving
aside information provided by the business cycle can be damaging for the performance of the
model. Hence looking carefully at models relying on ﬁnancial market information, we show
how traditional models can be enhanced while remaining parsimonious.
14A. A Semi-Parametric Framework for Intensities
In this section we develop a semi-parametric framework to model default intensities and
test the impact of the covariates presented above. We start from a fully non-parametric
estimator of default intensities based on the Gamma kernel. We then add a parametric com-
ponent using Cox proportional hazard methodology (Cox (1972) (1975)), a well known tool
in biostatistics, both with time-independent and time-dependent covariate speciﬁcations. The
baseline hazard is estimated using the GRHE estimator10 (Gamma Ramlau-Hansen Estima-
tor) as the solution of the maximum likelihood objective function, while the parametric part
is estimated by partial likelihood. A complete survey of related models, estimation techniques
and asymptotics can be found in Andersen & Gill (1982) or Andersen & al. (1997).
The GRHE estimator
The GRHE estimator has been introduced by Couderc (2004). It is based on a convenient
Gamma kernel smoother of the cumulative hazard rate belonging to the popular Nelson-Aalen
class11. As duration increases, the number of ﬁrms under observation tends to zero. Standard
smooth estimators with ﬁnite and symmetrical support need large bandwidths (smoothing
parameters) to provide estimations in the long run. Therefore they suﬀer from oversmoothing,
which reinforces the boundary bias inherent to these kernels (e.g. see Bouermani & Scaillet
(2001) for the properties of asymmetric kernels on density function estimations). Couderc
[2004] has shown that the GRHE is free of boundary bias12 and is able to capture changes in
intensities in the short run (which may cover up to 5 years) as well as subsequent deformations,
whereas Fledelius & al. (2004) obtained ﬂat intensities using the standard Epanechnikov kernel.
Empirical applications hereafter prove that not using an unbiased estimator would lead to
inaccurate assessments of intensity variations as well as of factor models.
The necessary conditions ensuring the consistency of the estimator are assumed to be met.
Accordingly, all ﬁrms in a given risk class are supposed to be homogenous and conditionally
independent. Censoring mechanisms which may prevent from observing ﬁrms up to their
default time are random and independent from the default process. For a given ﬁrm, these
mechanisms are reported through the process Y i (u). The most important building block of
the GRHE lies in the following assumption :
Assumption III.1 The intensity of individual ﬁrms satisﬁes the Multiplicative Intensity Model:
λi (u)=α(u)Y i (u) (3)
where α(u) is deterministic and called the hazard rate whereas Y i (u) is a predictable and
observable process.
10The use of a Gamma kernel estimator is crucial to capture variations in intensities of default and deﬁciencies
of models. The deﬁnition is given below.
11See Andersen & al. (1997) (1982) for details on the Nelson-Aalen estimator and its properties.
12This feature has already been widely documented in the case of density function estimation with semi-ﬁnite
support. For instance see Chen (2000).
15Remark that the diﬀerence between the intensity and the hazard rate resides in their
observability. The hazard rate is the relevant quantity. The estimator is speciﬁed as :
Deﬁnition III.1 The gamma kernel estimator b α(u) of the hazard rate (Gamma Ramlau-











where dNs counts the number of default at time s and Y (u) is computed as the number
of ﬁrms for which the last time of observation is greater than u. Y (u) is usually described as
the risk set and handles censoring. b is a smoothing parameter, the so-called bandwidth. The
intuition behind this non-parametric estimator is as follows: the probability of default over the
next inﬁnitesimal time step is estimated as a weighted average of past, current and subsequent
instantaneous default rates. The weights are determined by the choice of the kernel, by the
bandwidth as well as by the durations between default events. Default rates are computed as
the ratio of the number of ﬁrms defaulting at the same time over the number of ﬁrms in the
sample which survived up to that time.
The restrictions imposed on the process Y (u) are suﬃciently weak to permit more complex
speciﬁcations of this process. In what follows we rely on the multiplicative intensity model,
to enrich the ﬁrm-speciﬁcp a r to ft h ei n t e n s i t ys p e c i ﬁcation by introducing covariates. As a
consequence, one should think about this non-parametric estimator as a useful diagnostic tool
to model the unexplained baseline hazard.
Assessment of Factor Models
Let Z denote a vector of covariates. We assess the performance of factor models in explaining
intensities by relaxing the conditional exponentiality assumption. Therefore the parametric
part reﬂects implications of covariates, whereas the baseline hazard or conditional distribution
of the errors is estimated through a slight modiﬁcation of the GRHE.
Assumption III.2 The intensities conditional on structural factors are proportional to a class
baseline intensity λ◦ (u) representing the common intensity shape:










where Z(ti,u+ ti) is the set of structural variables taken at the date of entry ti of the ﬁrm i in
the class or at calendar time u+ti,a n dβ is the vector of sensitivities associated with a given
risk class.
16In this framework, provided that structural variables dynamics are not explosive, the
Gamma kernel estimator of the baseline hazard α◦ (u) becomes:
Corollary 1 Under assumptions III.1 and III.2, a semi-parametric estimator of the baseline























A convenient feature of this model is that an estimate b b β of the sensitivities β can be derived
separately from the baseline intensity through Cox partial likelihood:











β0Z(ti,u k + ti)
¢ (8)
where uk is the observed duration of ﬁrm k and tk is its date of entry in the class. This
powerful two-stage estimation technique does not aﬀect the non-parametric estimation of the
baseline intensity as the speed of convergence of the partial likelihood estimator is of order
1 √
n and therefore higher than that of the kernel estimator. In particular, conﬁdence intervals
on the baseline estimator are not aﬀected by the estimation of β. It then corresponds to the
parametric factor model case from equation (1) where the constraint λ◦ (u)=e x p( γ) has been
imposed. Corollary 1 is a direct consequences of Andersen & al. (1997) and Couderc (2004),
b b α
◦
being the maximum likelihood gamma kernel estimator of the baseline intensity.
B. Contemporaneous Financial Markets Factors Failure
The semi-parametric framework presented above allows us to test the relative performance
of the various factors and its evolution through time. This is achieved by comparing fully
non-parametric speciﬁcations and semi-parametric models. In particular the time-dependent
covariate framework allows to value the quality of factor models reﬂecting insights of the two
standard modelling setting, namely structural and reduced form models.
For each semi-parametric model we can associate a factor model counterpart. Remark that
even if the estimation process is not the same, sensitivities to covariates should be equivalent13
in both methodologies. We checked this last point and found that all factors keep the same
signs at the same horizons when switching from a parametric factor model to a semi-parametric
speciﬁcation. Only small variations in magnitude can be observed as expected. On the IG and
NIG samples signiﬁcant coeﬃcients do not change. On rating subsamples, some coeﬃcients
13The diﬀerence between the estimation approaches of b β and b b β only lies in the slower rate of convergence of
the semi-parametric speciﬁcation to its asymptotic distribution with respect to the parametric model.
17become insigniﬁcant. However the main issue consists of the capacity of stock and treasury
bond markets shocks to capture real intensities of default. If ﬁnancial markets factors provide
an appropriate representation of default intensities, then the estimated baseline hazard b b α
◦
(u)
should be close to a constant function. Indeed previous analyses and results from Fledelius &
al (2004) and Couderc (2004) indicate that after initial informational adjustments (at entry
in a new class, up to 2 to 4 years), the credit riskiness of ﬁrms from a homogenous risk class
should be similar whatever their duration in the class. In other words, on the long run the
baseline hazard is constant and shifts in this baseline results from changes in the economy
through time. Tables VI and VII present estimates of sensitivities b b β for diﬀerent speciﬁcations
on the basis of ﬁnancial predictors over rating classes.
[INSERT TABLE VI HERE]
Table VI stages three multifactor models ﬁtted on contemporaneous stock market and
interest rate information over various rating classes. For robustness checks, we included a
dummy indicating non-US ﬁrms. Sensitivities to this non-US indicator were not signiﬁcant.
Likelihood ratios select the joint model as the best one, whereas interest rates alone provide the
poorest ﬁts. These results conﬁrm ﬁndings of Driessen (2002) or Janosi & al. (2002) on credit
spreads. From unreported estimates of b b α
◦
(u), interest rates appear to be unhelpful explanatory
covariates of default accross rating classes. On the contrary stock market information brings
signiﬁcant explanatory power. In a Merton-like intensity model with additional stochastic
liabilities, it could be interpreted as evidence of the level and higher variability of assets being
the main determinants of the default probability changes. Figures 1(a) and 1(c) focus on IG
and NIG classes displaying baseline hazard rates for non-parametric (b α(u)), semi-parametric
(b b α
◦
(u)) and parametric speciﬁcations (dashed lines). In the latter, the baseline hazard is
always constant. The baseline hazard is leveled down by 29% for the IG category thanks
to stock indicators. However it is very clear from the graph that a constant intensity either
unconditional or conditional on stock information does not represent the data accurately, in
particular in the NIG class. Indeed deviations from the constant (blue lines) remain signiﬁcant,
implying that the S&P500 returns and volatility do not succeed in capturing shocks of the
economy which aﬀect the default riskiness. As expected short term default probabilities are
poorly predicted and for all classes but the CCC class, and completely overstated (the dashed
line is higher than b b α
◦
(u) u pt o2t o4y e a r s ) .D e v i a t i o n sa r en o ts i g n i ﬁcantly reduced in the
NIG class, and default probabilities are overestimated on a larger part of the debt life. In
an attempt to capture eﬀects of the 2001 default peak, the model grants too much weight to
covariations between the stock market and defaults14. Notice that given our sample window,
the 2001 recession is responsible to a large extent for the ﬁrst hump of b α(u) (among NIG
observed durations which range between 1 to 5 years approximately one fourth faced the 1991
recession at these horizons while one half faced the 2001 recession).
14We check this overﬁtting problem due to the 2001 recession by estimating the "Stock Market" model on the
subsample constituted by ﬁrms entered in the process after the 03/01/1991. This basically cuts durations higher
than 10 years, and thus the second hump on intensity graphs. On this reduced sample the model delivers higher
sensitivities of -2.82 on the S&P500 return and of 3.14 on its volatility for IG, -1.99** and 0.88** respectively
for NIG. At the same time it also exhibits a higher overestimation of instantaneous probabilities from the 6 to
10 remaining years after the peak.
18Interestingly, the market volatility exhibits lower signiﬁcance than the market return in
Table VI. Its relative impact on default is minor with respect to other factors. Corresponding
coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant in ﬁfty percent of the cases. Such a ﬁnding is highly challenging for
structural models as the volatility determines the dynamics of equities and as a consequence
default probabilities. However the main impact of volatility may not immediate but may arise
at a longer horizon: default is usually a progressive and lenghty process. These results prove
that transitory market shocks are not drivers of the default cycle. We still have to determine if
these shocks are meaningful on the long run. Yet remark that the BBB class seems to be much
more aﬀected by market volatility. As BBB corporate bonds are much shocked by demand
and supply eﬀects, this result agrees with the hypothesis of Collin-Dufresne & al. (2001).
For instance, some fund managers systematically rule out non investment grade corporate
bonds from their portfolios: at the time of a downgrade from BBB, numerous funds close their
positions. The market volatility should be a good proxy for that kind of market segmentation
behaviour and consequently has to be a key indicator for the BBB class.
Stock and interest rate-based factor models have now become a market standard to model
default probabilities. However their empirical performance has been challenged in many oc-
casions. We have just shown that this failure is still true under the historical probability
measure, meaning that such a failure should not be due to control problems or mixing of risk
eﬀects present under the pricing measure. More importantly by decomposing their perfor-
m a n c et h r o u g ht i m e ,w eh a v es h o w nt h a tt h e yl e ad to overestimating default riskiness over
the bottom part of the default cycle but still missing levels of default probabilities during top
parts. Yet, some researchers as Yu (2002) believe that factor models are not doomed to fail.
Our previous outcomes suggest that this incapacity to explain changes in default risk exposure
may lie ﬁrst in the reduced information set used, and then in the fact that contemporaneous
persistent shocks modify the default cycle several months after they happen. We now test
these hypotheses.
C .J o i n tP e r f o r m a n c eo fD e f a u l tI n d i c a t o r s
Univariate analyses have established a strong impact of the business cycle on default in-
tensities. To our knowledge, such a relationship, although highly intuitive, has never been
taken into account in factor models. We may explain this phenomenon by the fact that market
factor are expected to integrate business cycle information. The market supplies notwithstand-
ing for a noisy signal of the business cycle. As we already stressed, these are not substitute.
Thus we study whether the business cycle and ﬁnancial markets are complementary predictors
of the default cycle, and to what extent business indicators reduce the unexplained part in
the intensities variations. We select the most successful factors from our univariate analysis
according to their likelihood ratios. Table VII presents the outputs.
[INSERT TABLE VII HERE]
The model including the six factors outperforms models using only stock market or interest
rate information, according to LR tests. It manifests that all mentioned components (ﬁnancial,
19business and credit) of the economy bring their own contribution to the behaviour of default
probabilities. All covariates are statistically signiﬁcant at standard conﬁdence levels. Most of
the selected factors are not highly correlated, except the GDP and the S&P500 return which
exhibit a correlation of 36%. This explains the fading of weights on stock market in this 6-
factors model as the GDP oﬀers a higher univariate marginal impact. LR tests suggest that
all covariates bring additional information and should be kept. They all enter the model with
the predicted signs. Figures 1(b) and 1(d) show that the baseline hazard is strongly shifted
downwards by 62% and that distortions have been reduced, compared to Figures 1(a) and
1(c). This evidence that the new factors are key determinants of the default regime changes.
The default process cannot be reduced to a simple outcome of a decrease in ﬁrms’ asset value.
Notice that most of the additional explanatory power comes from real GDP growth and NIG
downgrade rates, indicating a heavy impact of business conditions, as well as a persistence in
erosion of ﬁrms’ quality.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
We can observe that the humps still exists which implies that our contemporaneous deter-
minants do not capture all joint movements of the default cycle through time. The presence
of humps suggests that the default cycle is longer than the business cycle and that some per-
sistency has to be incorporated. Furthermore, we observe that the tendency to overestimate
default probabilities on low grades is due to incapacity of traditional factors to explain the
huge number of defaults observed in the latest default crisis. As correlations of default seemed
to be particularly high during this period, we may believe that this failure could be reduced
by modelling snowball eﬀects, for instance through industry contagion as we will see later.
D. Trends and Persistency of Shocks
So far, all selected variables have been contemporaneous, but potential lead-lag eﬀects
from ﬁnancial markets or the business cycle on the default cycle should also be considered.
Looking back at Table II, in a univariate setting, we can observe that lagged variables may
have more explanatory power than current economic conditions, and some variables lead the
default cycle by an average of three years. Besides, lagged information could capture parts of
persistency patterns. Considering both contemporaneous and lagged factors indeed pick up
economic trends. Therefore, we adapt the "stock market" model which is the most akin to
structural credit risk models, and add lagged volatility and stock market return. Estimated
parameters b b β a r ep r o v i d e di nT a b l eV I I I .
[INSERT TABLE VIII HERE]
Results show that lagged information is relevant in addition to contemporaneous one. While
current volatility is not statistically signiﬁcant for some classes, lagged volatility always is,
except for the AA class. Moreover for all classes but the BBB a one percent change in past
20volatility has an impact three times higher than the same change in contemporaneous volatility.
This is consistent with our earlier ﬁndings. In other words current demand and supply shocks
are dominated by past market movements. It shows that the default cycle lags the economy.
However both current and lagged volatilities are associated with higher default rates, which
implies that trends induce higher intensity shifts. The results on lagged returns still imply that
high equity returns tend to be associated with higher default probabilities three years later. As
emphasized earlier, by combining current and lagged returns we capture the long term trend
in ﬁnancial markets. Figure 3 shows that it has a stronger inﬂuence on the behaviour of the
default cycle. We can propose explanations for this ﬁnding. First, it may reﬂect some cyclicality
in equity returns. We have found that high current equity returns tend to be associated with
low current default rates. If there is cyclicality in equity returns, with a peak-to-trough time
of approximately 3 years, it is plausible that high returns will be associated with high default
rates 3 years on. Nonetheless we have found no evidence of such a cyclicality. An alternative
explanation would be that in good times (when the equity market is performing well) companies
can aﬀord to raise large amounts of debt while preserving acceptable levels of leverage. Several
years later, this level of debt may become unsustainable for some ﬁrms, thereby raising the
default rate. Table VIII does not contradict such a hypothesis: if the market keeps the same
upward trend during three years, the market appreciation induces a decrease in intensities for
Investment Grades whereas those of Non Investment Grade corporates are pushed up.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
We ﬁnd that including lags substantially improves the models from LR tests. Figures 2(a)
and 2(b) diagnose signiﬁcant decreases in baseline hazards (about 64% for IG) as well as in
deviations from the constant, compared to Figures 1(a) and 1(c). The improvement is even
more substantial than that achieved by additional business and credit indicators for the NIG
class. We can observe a global levelling down of the errors. Once again the latter result may be
strongly dependent on our sample window but Altman (1989) among others already suggested
that lagged dependencies would be useful because of the lag between the time at which a ﬁrm
starts experiencing diﬃculties and its default time.
IV. Exploratory Issues
A. Industries as Alternative Source of Information
In the previous section, we observed that a signiﬁcant part of variations in NIG intensities
was still unexplained by covariates. We pointed out the huge number of defaults that occurred
during and after the 2001 recession and the diﬃculty for factor models to ﬁt this peak. We have
ignored contagion eﬀects so far. Reduced form models relying on structural factors have often
been criticised for failing to replicate empirically the observed default correlation. Jarrow &
Yu (2001), Yu (2002) and Gagliardini & Gouriéroux (2003) documented the fact that when a
21ﬁrm defaults in a portfolio, other ﬁrms’ intensities may jump and generate substantial default
correlation. Contagion models (e.g. Davis (1999), Davis & Lo (2001a) (2001b), Schoenbucher
& Schubert (2001)) are able to replicate some of these eﬀects but they are often diﬃcult to
calibrate. Kyiotaki & Moore (1997) have shown through a theoretical equilibrium model that
the business cycle may only be a contagion vehicle. "Disease" starts from local changes in the
credit cycle (roughly among an industry) and leads to global shocks in defaults. Therefore,
in such a context it will be impossible to design a consistent model using only calendar time
dependent factors, and leaving aside pure default information and industrial factors. Koopman
& Lucas (2004) studied this cyclicality using the well-established machinery of VAR models
and including in cycles. Using GDP, bankruptcy rates and credit spreads as respective proxies
for the business cycle, global credit cycle and pure default cycle, they show that co-movements
between economic conditions and defaults may arise in the long term. However, as in previous
studies, no general pattern can be extracted from the data but their ﬁndings support the idea
that parts of the credit and default cycles contain their own dynamics. In this section we
further document this phenomenon which may be instrumental in explaining the high level of
defaults observed in the last recession.
In a two-state hidden Markov chain model, Crowder, Davis & Giampieri (2003) showed that
adverse economic conditions do not aﬀect all industries in the same way. There is evidence of
sector-speciﬁc crisis, such as that aﬀecting the energy sector in the mid-eighties or the telecom
crisis of the early 2000s. Therefore, the number of defaults occurring in a given industry and
in a given time step may represent a good indicator of the health of this industry and be useful
in predicting default probabilities over the next time step. If the business cycle is really a
contagion vehicle, such factors may eﬃciently enlarge the information set we previously used.
In order to test this, we rely on a class of autoregressive models that have been introduced
to study the durations between trades in microstructure econometrics. These models are called
Autoregressive Conditional Duration (ACD) models. More specially we focus on a log-ACD
speciﬁcation (see Bauwens & Giot (2000) and Engle & Russel (1998)). The intuition is the
following. If one observes short times between defaults in a given sector, it probably means that
the sector faces a crisis and therefore that one can expect the next default to occur shortly. In
terms of intensities, it implies that the intensity of a ﬁrm in a given sector should be inversely
related with past durations between two defaults in that sector. ACD models allow to take
those eﬀects into account by assuming that the expected duration until the next default is
a function of past durations. Hence, defaults will tend to cluster. We control for sector size
because, even if probabilities of default remain constant over time, variations in the sector size
will artiﬁcially create clusters in the sector intensity of default. Obviously large sectors will
face a higher number of defaults than smaller ones for equivalent default probabilities.
F o rag i v e nr i s kc l a s sc, we consider an aggregate counting process Nc
t . We introduce
additional left-censoring for each ﬁrm i deﬁning Si =m a x {τj+1;τj <t i} where τk denotes
the kth jump time of the process Nc
t . This censoring scheme is designed to take into account
only ﬁrms which were already in the class c before the last observed default time in this
22class. Thus the process Nc








I(τi≥Si ; Di +ti=τi ; Di≤Ui).15 We now specify the intensity of the process Nc
t .
Assumption IV.1 Durations between two jumps of the counting process Nc
t follow a log-
ACD(1,1) model :
τk − τk−1 = ψc (k)  (k) (9)
log(ψc (k)) = wc + ac log(τk−1 − τk−2)+bc log(ψc (k − 1)) (10)
= wc + ac log( (k − 1)) + (ac + bc)log(ψc (k − 1))
where  (k) are independent unit exponential variables16.
ψc (k) is known right after the (k − 1)
th default and represents the expected duration up
to the kth default given the population under observation at time τk−1. In other words,
conditionally on the past, durations between defaults are exponentially distributed and we
assume that both right truncation and left censoring are uninformative. We now extract the
relevant information for ﬁrms in the simplest way17:
Assumption IV.2 The intensity of default within the risk class c aﬀects all ﬁrms in the same
way, and intensity λi of ﬁrm i is given by
λi (u,ti)=λ◦ (u + ti)








If X (k) is the number of ﬁrms under observation for the kth duration, it simply states that the
common intensity λ◦ of ﬁrms which belong to the class c is given by λ◦ (k)= 1
ψc(k) X(k).T h i s
last statement says that durations between consecutive default are also inversely proportional
to the number ﬁrms in the risk class.
[INSERT TABLE IX HERE]
Table 6 provides the estimated parameters for the above model on 11 broad industry
categories deﬁned by Standard & Poor’s. We ﬁnd high levels of persistency for most industries.
15Remark that by considering durations between default times, we do not focus on the complete natural
ﬁltration generated by all ﬁrms as we do not take entry dates into account.
16In order not to introduce bias, τ0 w i l lb et h ed a t ea tw h i c ht h eﬁr s td e f a u l th a sb e e no b s e r v e di nt h er i s k
class.
17Assumption IV.2 could be enriched by conditioning on business and ﬁnancial covariates.
23Implied intensities provide the most interesting results. Figures 4, 5 and 6 show that the macro-
economic cycle does not have the same impact on default intensities in all industries, as found
by Crowder, Davis & Giampieri (2003) in a simpler framework. For instance Figure 6(a) shows
that the telecommunication sector was not aﬀected by the 1990-1991 downturn but was the
most hit by the 2001 recession. 1986-1987 appears to have been a crisis period for the energy
sector, while other sectors were little aﬀected.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]
Several other phenomena can be identiﬁed in these pictures. First, the persistency of the
default cycle can be observed: inter-default intensities remain high several years after the peak
of a recession. Second, we can see that some sectors appear to be forerunners of economic
downturns, while others seem to follow recessions. As a consequence, information relating
to sectors whose default cycle leads the economic cycle could prove valuable for credit risk
management. The default rate in these industries may be a good variable to forecast the
aggregate default rate in the economy. This is left for further research. Remark that we ran
estimations on BB, B and CCC rating classes too. Obviously the levels of implied intensities
were found to be increasing with decreasing rating quality but variations and log-ACD(1,1)
coeﬃcients do not display diﬀerent patterns. Therefore default rates in various rating classes
cannot be used to forecast default rates in other classes. However remark that it gives support
to the fact that migrations should be mainly driven by only one underlying factor.
B. Modelling Default Probabilities
We showed that large errors can be made when evaluating default probabilities over the ﬁrst
months in a given risk class. Our results suggest that a way to correct for this phenomenon
would be to include a variable reﬂecting economic conditions at the ﬁrm’s entry in the class.
This term would be speciﬁed such that its eﬀect would vanish with time, i.e. initial condi-
tions would progressively become irrelevant. However Figure 3 displays other insights in that
direction, putting forward assumptions on times-to-default distributions over rating classes as
am a j o ri s s u e .
The practical implications of such assumptions are critical in the valuation of complex
derivatives such as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) or nth-to-default. Madan & al.
(2004) investigate empirical distributions of the life of such derivatives under the pricing mea-
sure. They ﬁnd evidences toward increasing intensity shapes but they cannot identify whether
the phenomenon is due to the time proﬁle of default probabilities or to the market assessment
of credit riskiness (i.e. risk premia). Our study allows to conﬁrm that intensities of times-
to-default are not constant. It strongly support the use of Weibull distributions as common
baseline instead of the exponential distribution. The Weibull distribution produces monotoni-
cally increasing or decreasing intensities exactly as we obtained. These results echo ﬁndings of
24Madan & al. and prove that, conditional on the realization of the factors, the Weibull indepen-
dence assumption should be preferred to the usual exponential independence of ﬁrms. Among
all rating classes but the B and CCC we ﬁnd that default intensities globally increase with
durations (Figure 3 present estimations on the BBB to CCC classes). Junk issuers exhibit a
globally decreasing intensity implying that, as time elapses and conditional on non defaulting,
their ﬁnancial standing should improve. Junk issuers can be seen as "do or die" ﬁrms. They
will either default quickly or, given their high level of leverage and ﬁrm risk, they may be very
successful in the longer term. Therefore, conditional on surviving the ﬁrst few years, their
default probability should fall substantially over the long term. Most startups would fall in
this category but they are not captured in our sample as very few of them are rated. Non-junk
issuers exhibit an increasing hazard rate, reﬂecting increasing uncertainty in the longer term.
Madan & al. explain such a result by an over-exposure to innovation for established ﬁrms.
Increasing exposures to managerial ineﬃciency and agency conﬂicts can also induce increasing
likelihood of default for large companies. Economic conditions enter then the default problem
producing shocks along with the intensity trajectory.
Finally remark that, coming back to reduced form models, our ﬁndings indicate that the
choice of intensity’s dynamics has to be made with care. Single factor models such as CIR
processes, are unlikely to be good performers in the long run. If a two factor model with time
varying long term trend might be more appropriate, we overall stress that the importance of
past information once again casts doubt on Markovian speciﬁcations.
Summary
In this paper we study times-to-default in the Standard & Poor’s rated universe. We rely
on a simple framework that enables us to analyse the behaviour of default probabilities with
respect to changes in stock and bond markets indicators under the historical measure. The
setting decomposes explanatory errors through time. More importantly, we investigate other
sources of information which should alter the default cycle and which have been left aside by
the credit literature, namely the business cycle and endogenous proxies from credit markets
and the default cycle. We explore further the sensitivity of probabilities to past economic
conditions. Surprisingly, this question has been bypassed by researchers whereas short run
cocyclicality is doubtful (e.g. Koopman & Lucas (2004)).
Our ﬁrst empirical results conﬁrm the weak explanatory power of contemporaneous ﬁnan-
cial market factors. They overall show that changes in intensities cannot be attributed solely
to ﬁnancial variables such as equity returns, their volatility or interest rates but the business
cycle and the speciﬁc behaviour of credit markets are key determinants of future default prob-
abilities. As a consequence, the signiﬁcant explanatory variables found in our study can be
used to improve traditional credit risk models. In particular, a set of carefully selected fac-
tors from each information source can substantially enhance the eﬃciency of factor models in
capturing movements in default probabilities. They demonstrate that common factors should
account for a larger part of probability changes than reported by studies on corporate spreads.
Additional research quantifying these eﬀects on spreads and repercussions in standard risk
25management models would be highly valuable. Non ﬁnancial indicators indeed are able to
partially correct the tendency of ﬁnancial based factor models to overstate real default proba-
bilities in expansions and stable periods, and to undershoot default peaks during and following
recessions.
Our results also show that past information has special beneﬁts. Economic trends and large
past shocks appears as main drivers of default probabilities. Both structural and reduced form
models usually only feature short term shocks, whereas long term business trends are ignored.
However, our results evidence that default is triggered by their joint impact, indicating that
eﬃcient models should incorporate them. Intuitively, corporate defaults may be induced by
large changes in local or global economic conditions but also by successive declines in a com-
pany’s performance. The legal process may also delay the default event which in turn might not
be explained anymore by contemporaneous ﬁnancial or business indicators. We consequently
argue that past information constitutes a crucial component of adequate modelling, implying
that Markovian speciﬁcation of intensities cannot provide pertinent pictures of their evolution.
Finally, we highlight issues for future research. In an analysis of durations between consec-
utive defaults within industrial classes we show that strong diﬀerences prevail between sectors.
Some industries lead the global default cycle while others maintain high levels of defaults dur-
ing economic recoveries. This suggests the existence of bidirectional contagion between the
default cycle and the business cycle. Loosely speaking, this phenomenon makes the default
cycle slower and more persistent than economic factors can predict. Therefore, to succeed
in capturing default probability variations, we suggest that more predictive proxies could be
endogenously extracted from the default process itself, and for instance from industrial classes.
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29Figure 1
Baseline Hazards of Multifactor Models
Estimated non-parametric baseline hazard rates α◦ (u) and corresponding means over Investment
Grades and Non Investment Grades. Black lines denote the full non-parametric model (α(u,ti)=






Dashed lines represent averages of baselines - they are not statistically diﬀerent from the estimated






Market" model uses the contemporaneous return and volatility on the S&P500. The "Best Six" model
includes in addition the US Term Structure Slope, the real GDP growth, the BBB spread and the NIG
downgrade rate.



















Years from the origin
(a) IG, "Stock Market" model
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Years from the origin
(c) NIG, "Stock Market" model





















Years from the origin
(d) NIG, "Best Six" model
30Figure 2
IG and NIG Baseline Hazards of MultiFactor Models with Past Information
Estimated non-parametric baseline hazard rates α◦ (u) and corresponding means over Investment
Grades and Non Investment Grades. Black lines denote the full non-parametric model (α(u,ti)=






Dashed lines represent averages of baselines - they are not statistically diﬀerent from the estimated






"Stock Market" model uses the contemporaneous return and volatility on the S&P500 as well as their
three year lags.



















Years from the origin
(a) IG, improved "Stock Market" model






















Years from the origin
(b) NIG,improved "Stock Market" model
31Figure 3
Ratings Baseline Hazards of MultiFactor Models with Past Information
Estimated non-parametric baseline hazard rates α◦ (u) and corresponding means over Investment
Grades and Non Investment Grades. Black lines denote the full non-parametric model (α(u,ti)=






Dashed lines represent averages of baselines - they are not statistically diﬀerent from the estimated






Market" model (red) uses the contemporaneous return and volatility on the S&P500. The improved
"Stock Market" model (blue) adds the three year lags.




















Years from the origin
(a) BBB class





















Years from the origin
(b) BB class
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Years from the origin
(d) CCC class
32Figure 4
Intra-Industry Implied Hazard Rates
Predicted intensity of default λ
◦ for diﬀerent industries using a log-ACD(1,1) model on inter-default
durations within sectors.

























































































Intra-Industry Implied Hazard Rates
Predicted intensity of default λ
◦ for diﬀerent industries using a log-ACD(1,1) model on inter-default
durations within sectors.



































































(c) High Tech./Oﬃce Eq.

























Intra-Industry Implied Hazard Rates
Predicted intensity of default λ
◦ for diﬀerent industries using a log-ACD(1,1) model on inter-default
durations within sectors.


































































Basic statistics on retained factors. Figures are given on an annual basis. All variables but upgrade
and downgrade rates are US indicators.
Mean Min Max Volatility 3 Year Autocorrelation
S&P500 Return 0.093 -0.324 0.439 0.158 -0.12
S&P500 Vol. 0.154 0.063 0.628 0.073 0.08
Treas. 10 yr. Yield 0.079 0.033 0.153 0.028 -0.23
Term Struc. Slope 0.013 -0.021 0.033 0.011 -0.08
Real GDP Growth 0.030 -0.028 0.081 0.019 0.17
Des. Ind. Prod. Growth 0.002 -0.018 0.020 0.006 0.22
CPI Growth 0.035 0.011 0.118 0.019 0.60
Pers. Inc. Growth 0.060 0.015 0.134 0.023 -0.32
BBB Yield 0.100 0.062 0.172 0.027 0.62
BBB Spread 0.022 0.013 0.038 0.006 0.09
BBB-AAA Spread 0.011 0.006 0.027 0.004 0.44
Treas. Net Issues 0.144 -0.391 0.748 0.163 -0.12
Money Lending Growth 0.062 -0.039 0.128 0.039 0.16
IG Upgrade Rate 0.005 0 0.020 0.003 0.09
NIG Upgrade Rate 0.010 0 0.109 0.009 0.06
IG Downgrade Rate 0.011 0 0.031 0.006 0.04
NIG Downgrade Rate 0.017 0 0.131 0.013 -0.05
36Table II
Sensitivities w.r.t Financial Markets Information
Estimations of log-linear intensities λ
i (u,ti) on IG and NIG with time-varying covariates over the whole
sample up to last days of observation. The table displays sensitivities β from univariate speciﬁcations
λ
i (u,ti)=e x p
¡
γ + β
0Z (u + ti)
¢
where the default arrival is assumed to be piecewise exponential
conditional on factor realizations. We consider lags from ﬁve years backward to two months forward.
Constants γ are not reported. * (resp. **) stands for signiﬁcance at 95% (resp. 99%) conﬁdence level.
For each factor the lag oﬀering the highest likelihood ratio has been stressed in italics.
Investment Grades
Lag S&P500 Return S&P500 Vol. Treas Yield Term Str.Slope
-2M -2.19** 2.92** -15.87** 42.31**
-1M -2.25** 3.36** -15.98** 40.69**
0M -2.72** 3.80** -15.33** 38.44**
1M -2.85** 3.99** -15.35** 33.11**
2M -2.77** 3.65** -14.57** 29.59**
3M -2.61** 3.50** -13.90 28.29**
6M -2.40** 3.11** -11.84** 18.84**
1Y -1.96** 2.59** -11.07** -3.56
2Y -.49 3.85** -9.08** -28.18**
3Y 1.33** 3.85** -11.75** -20.84**
5Y 1.12** 3.54** -10.79** -7.55
Non Investment Grades
Lag S&P500 Return S&P500 Vol. Treas Yield Term Str.Slope
-2M -1.99** 1.78** -10.88** 24.83**
-1M -1.89** 1.81** -10.91** 22.54**
0M -1.96** 2.10** -10.41** 19.66**
1M -2.05** 2.39** -10.44** 16.93**
2M -2.02** 2.47** -10.45** 13.53**
3M -2.01** 2.47** -10.03** 10.98**
6M -1.76** 2.51** -8.57** .45
1Y -1.02** 1.99** -7.05** -19.00**
2Y .16 2.84** -6.53** -29.72**
3Y 1.66** 3.60** -12.21** -21.08**
5Y 1.28** 2.49** -7.64** -12.30**
37Table III
Sensitivities w.r.t. Business Cycle Information
Estimations of log-linear intensities λ
i (u,ti) on IG and NIG with time-varying covariates over the whole
sample up to last days of observation. The table displays sensitivities β from univariate speciﬁcations
λ
i (u,ti)=e x p
¡
γ + β
0Z (u + ti)
¢
where the default arrival is assumed to be piecewise exponential
conditional on factor realizations. We consider lags from ﬁve years backward to two months forward.
Constants γ are not reported. * (resp. **) stands for signiﬁcance at 95% (resp. 99%) conﬁdence level.
For each factor the lag oﬀering the highest likelihood ratio has been stressed in italics.
Investment Grades
Lag Real GDP Growth Ind. Prod Growth CPI Growth Pers. Inc Growth
-2M -17.70** -21.54 -16.36** -25.96**
-1M -17.47** -48.37** -15.85** -27.13**
0M -19.23** -38.40** -15.08** -26.74**
1M -20.81** -46.55** -12.77* -25.14**
2M -19.97** -20.68 -11.57* -23.49**
3M -21.91** -57.27** -9.85** -22.16**
6M -19.84** -46.64** -4.47 -18.09**
1Y -12.62** -47.77** -2.76 -9.72**
2Y 3.29 -24.67* -3.91 3.13**
3Y 15.32** 5.99 -16.07** -.40
5Y 17.42** 23.95 -22.23** -4.42
Non Investment Grades
Lag Real GDP Growth Ind. Prod Growth CPI Growth Pers. Inc Growth
-2M -21.27** -35.17** -9.09** -20.58**
-1M -21.44** -39.38** -7.87** -19.82**
0M -22.66** -36.20** -5.87** -18.78**
1M -23.01** -50.57** -4.47* -17.26**
2M -22.32** -37.65** -3.56** -15.11**
3M -22.58** -54.06** -2.02 -13.16**
6M -17.57** -53.61** 1.83 -7.93**
1Y -6.78** -35.55** .53 -.45
2Y 10.27** -4.75 -2.95** 5.29**
3Y 11.71** 13.65** -15.50** 1.34
5Y 11.28** 15.10** -11.96** -3.07
38Table IV
Sensitivities w.r.t. Credit Markets Information
Estimations of log-linear intensities λ
i (u,ti) on IG and NIG with time-varying covariates over the whole
sample up to last days of observation. The table displays sensitivities β from univariate speciﬁcations
λ
i (u,ti)=e x p
¡
γ + β
0Z (u + ti)
¢
where the default arrival is assumed to be piecewise exponential
conditional on factor realizations. We consider lags from ﬁve years backward to two months forward.
Constants γ are not reported. * (resp. **) stands for signiﬁcance at 95% (resp. 99%) conﬁdence level.
For each factor the lag oﬀering the highest likelihood ratio has been stressed in italics.
Investment Grades
Lag BBB Yield BBB Spread IG Spread Treas. Issues Money Lending
-2M -10.28** 73.55** 50.50** 1.70** 2.05
-1M -10.23** 75.08** 50.38** 1.55** 2.54
0M -9.65** 74.35** 44.63** .99** 3.39
1M -9.39** 76.89** 41.38** .90* 4.45*
2M -9.05** 72.86** 34.49** .98** 4.78**
3M -8.38* 72.70** 35.73** 1.09** 5.32**
6M -6.95** 65.61** 25.75 .24 6.33**
1Y -7.51* 49.11** -7.02 -.75* 9.34**
2Y -6.24* 44.19** -19.64 -2.43** 9.02**
3Y -8.60 41.57** -13.48 -2.41** 12.09**
5Y -9.84** -4.38 -52.73** -3.39** 6.13**
Non Investment Grades
Lag BBB Yield BBB Spread IG Spread Treas. Issues Money Lending
-2M -5.62** 62.97** 53.08** .59** 4.56**
-1M -5.76** 62.07** 51.84** .46** 4.88**
0M -5.54** 59.09** 45.95** .14 5.41**
1M -5.45** 60.12** 39.87** -.02 6.00**
2M -5.42** 60.30** 31.96** -.22 6.34**
3M -5.02** 59.68** 28.85** -.26* 6.56**
6M -4.24** 51.92** 7.58* -.71** 7.10**
1Y -4.94** 28.91** -13.84** -1.61** 7.55**
2Y -5.42** 18.04** -23.09** -2.11** 7.17**
3Y -9.70** 30.16** -15.08** -1.76** 11.01**
5Y -7.91** -27.57** -47.58** -2.15** 4.71**
39Table V
Sensitivities to Aggregate Default Indicators
Estimations of log-linear intensities λ
i (u,ti) with time-varying covariates over the whole sample
up to last days of observation. The table displays sensitivities β from univariate speciﬁcations
λ
i (u,ti)=e x p
¡
γ + β
0Z (u + ti)
¢
where the default arrival is assumed to be piecewise exponential
conditional on factor realizations. Constants γ are not reported. * (resp. **) stands for signiﬁcance at
95% (resp. 99%) conﬁdence level.
Default Factors \ Ratings AA A BBB BB B CCC
IG Upgrade Rate -6.339 -16.691 -38.853 -42.941** -68.568** -70.051**
NIG Upgrade Rate -5.054 -7.651 -22.777 -28.416 -33.657** -41.229**
IG Downgrade Rate 38.517 53.027** 64.619** 59.399** 50.417** 34.746**
NIG Downgrade Rate 22.426 24.379** 23.822** 25.408** 26.206** 23.990**
40Table VI
Contemporaneous Financial Multifactor Models
Estimations of log-linear intensities λ
i (u,ti) with time-varying covariates over rating classes for
durations up to the ﬁrst exits and all countries. The table displays sensitivities β from multivariate
speciﬁcations λ





where the default arrival is assumed to be piecewise
exponential conditional on realizations of covariates. We focus on ﬁnancial market information as used
by several studies. Constants γ are not reported. * (resp. **) stands for signiﬁcance at 95% (resp.
99%) conﬁdence level.
Model Stock Interest Both Stock Interest Both
Market Rates Market Rates
Factors \ Class AA A
S&P500 Return -3.169** -3.033* -2.027** -1.674*
S&P500 Vol. 0.029 0.097 0.349 0.350
Treas. Yield -10.548 -5.704 -9.951** -6.675*
T e r m .S t r .S l o p e 19.72 12.008 27.326** 19.683
BBB BB
S&P500 Return -2.112** -1.441** -1.920** -1.436**
S&P500 Vol. 2.132** 2.552** 0.756** 1.15*
Treas. Yield -4.467 -1.899 -3.055* -1.137
T e r m .S t r .S l o p e 33.254** 25.661** 25.799** 17.109**
B CCC
S&P500 Return -1.965** -1.687** -1.273** -1.272**
S&P500 Vol. 0.329 0.166** 0.972* 0.351
Treas. Yield -8.364** -4.535** -14.611** -10.252**
T e r m .S t r .S l o p e 16.932** 4.913** -12.851* -10.981**
41Table VII
Parsimonious Multivariate Proportional Hazard Models
Estimations of semi-parametric models of default intensities with time-varying covariates over IG and








. * (resp. **) stands for signiﬁcance at
95% (resp. 99%) conﬁdence level.
Model Stock Interest Both Best Stock Interest Both Best
Market Rates Six Market Rates Six
Factors \ Class IG NIG
S&P500 Return -2.26** -1.39** -0.62* -1.87** -1.62** -0.23*
S&P500 Vol. 2.35** 2.53* 2.99** 0.50* 0.33* 0.66**
Treas. Yield -10.67** -4.37 -7.97** -4.21
Term. Str. Slope 32.22** 24.87** 26.91** 15.52** 4.09* 4.18**
GDP -10.15* -14.02**
BBB Spread 8.06 12.16**
NIG Down. Rate 14.92** 15.86**
42Table VIII
Improved Multivariate Proportional Hazard Models
Estimations of semi-parametric models of default intensities with time-varying covariates over rating








. * (resp. **) stands for signiﬁcance at
95% (resp. 99%) conﬁdence level.
Factors \ Class AA A BBB BB B CCC IG NIG
S&P500 Return
Contemporaneous -2.74* -1.23* -1.64** -1.08** -1.25** -0.653** -1.62* -1.15**
Three Year Lagged 1.39 0.94 0.45 1.56** 1.66** 2.49** 0.83 1.65**
S&P500 Volatility
Contemporaneous -0.84 0.25 2.28** 0.62* 0.65* 0.77* 2.52** 0.31
Three Year Lagged 1.94 3.54** 2.12** 3.65** 3.11** 2.41** 2.76** 3.13**
43Table IX
Intra-Industry Default Behaviour
Log-ACD(1,1) estimates on inter-default durations within various industry categories. Ljung-Box
Q-test and Arch-test on residuals including successively 1, 5, 10 and 20 lags (ﬁgures correspond to 20
lag) were found to be insigniﬁcant. * (resp. **) denotes signiﬁcance at the 95% (resp. 99%) conﬁdence
level. Other sectors, namely Insurance and Real Estate, were too sparse to run estimations.





232 0.1327 0.1356* 0.8434**
Consumer
Service Sector
296 0.1560* 0.1077** 0.8627**
Energy and
Natural Resources
88 0.7581 0.0494 0.7938**
Financial
Institutions
89 2.1295* 0.2483** 0.2964
Forest Products
and Building
68 0.9152* 0.3383** 0.5042**
Health Care
and Chemicals
81 0.1459 0.0423 0.9284**
High Tech
and Oﬃce Eq.
54 3.7032* 0.2779** 0.1516**
Leisure Time
and Media
162 0.4072 0.1421* 0.7745**
Telecommunications 141 0.2056* 0.1894** 0.7730**
Transports 79 0.0654 0.0422 0.9449**
Utility 57 0.1671 0.1203** 0.8532**
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